Does Space Matter to the Employment of TANF Recipients? Evidence from a Dynamic Discrete Choice Model with Unobserved Effects by Gurmu, Shiferaw et al.
Does Space Matter to the Employment of TANF Recipients? 
Evidence from a Dynamic Discrete Choice Model  
with Unobserved Effects* 
 
 
 
Shiferaw Gurmua, Keith R. Ihlanfeldtb, William J. Smithc** 
 
 
a Department of Economics, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University, 
P.O. Box 3992, Atlanta, GA 30302, USA 
b DeVoe L. Moore Center and Department of Economics, 150 Bellamy Building, Florida State 
University, Tallahassee, FL 32306, USA 
c Fiscal Research Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University, 
P.O. Box 3992, Atlanta, GA 30302, USA 
 
 
 
 
January 18, 2006 
 
 
                                                 
*  We thank Colleen Heflin, Peter Mueser, James Ziliak, and seminar participants at the Midwest 
Econometrics Group Meeting, Southern Economic Association Conference, Georgia State University, 
University of Kentucky and University of Tennessee-Knoxville for helpful comments on previous 
versions of this paper.  This project was supported with a grant from the UK Center for Poverty Research 
through the U.S.  Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for 
Planning and Evaluation, grant number 5 ASPE417-02.  The opinions and conclusions expressed herein 
are solely those of the authors and should not be construed as representing the opinions or policy of the 
UKCPR or any agency of the Federal government.   
 
** Corresponding author: William J. Smith, phone (404) 651-1908, fax (404) 651-0416, e-mail 
joeysmith@gsu.edu.  
 
 
 2
 
Abstract 
We study the factors affecting the employment probability of Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families (TANF) recipients using recent quarterly panel data from Atlanta, Georgia.  A 
central focus of our study is to determine whether the TANF recipient’s proximity to job 
opportunity and the availability of childcare affect her probability of full-time employment. 
Both static and dynamic models of employment choice are estimated that control for 
unobserved individual effects. We estimate models separately for a sub-sample of TANF 
recipients living in public housing, whose residential locations can be considered exogenously 
determined. We find substantial evidence that individual and family characteristics (such as, the 
education of the recipient and the number of children and adults in her family) are important 
determinants of the employment probability of welfare recipients. On the other hand, space-
related variables are found to be relatively unimportant. 
 
JEL Classification: I38, R23, J15, C23 
Keywords:  Welfare-to-work, space, dynamic panel data, public housing residents  
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1.  Introduction  
 
 The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 imposes 
stringent work requirements and time limits on welfare recipients – recipients must find work 
within two years of receiving benefits and lifetime benefits are limited to a total of five years.1 
This legislation has heightened interest in the factors that affect the employment probability of 
welfare recipients. These factors can be divided into two categories – family/individual-based 
and place-based. The former category includes the standard set of human capital variables 
(education, training, and experience) as well as the recipient’s attitudes, reliability, and 
motivation. Place (i.e., the recipient’s residential location) may affect employment probability 
in a variety of ways, but the two that have been given the most attention are job accessibility 
and neighborhood effects. Job access refers to the nearness of job openings to the home location 
which the recipient is qualified to hold. Neighborhood effects encompass a variety of 
mechanisms whereby a recipient’s neighbors may alter her/his willingness or ability to work. 
 Extant evidence on the effects of individual and place variables on the employment of 
welfare recipients, and low-skill workers generally, can be questioned because few studies have 
adequately dealt with the fact that residential location is self-selected. Biased estimates will 
result if unobservable characteristics of the individual affect both the choice of residential 
location (and thereby job access and neighborhood effects) as well as the probability of 
employment.  
 In the case of welfare recipients it has been argued that self-selection of residential 
location is not a major source of bias because recipients’ residential choices are highly restricted 
by their low incomes (Allard and Danziger, 2002). However, there is also evidence that 
suggests that two of the key individual attributes that result in a recipient having a job are 
reliability and motivation (Regenstein et al., 1998), which are generally unobservable variables. 
                                                 
1 The research presented in this paper is based on data from the state of Georgia, which limits lifetime 
benefits to only four years. 
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Even if low income limits residential choice, there may be enough choice that these variables 
are correlated with observable characteristics of the recipient’s residential location that affect 
employment probability. For example, recipients more motivated to work may perform better in 
job interviews and may be more likely to seek a place to live that offers nearby job 
opportunities. It is not clear therefore whether self-selection of residential location is more or 
less of an econometric issue for welfare recipients in comparison to low-skilled workers 
generally. 
 There are two approaches toward dealing with self-selection: 1) conduct a random 
assignment experiment or identify a natural experiment where location is random, and 2) rely 
upon panel estimation techniques that control for unobservable individual effects. In this paper 
both of these approaches are taken to study the factors affecting the employment probability of 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) recipients living within the Atlanta, Georgia 
metropolitan area. We have assembled a unique panel of the quarterly employment experience 
of individual TANF recipients that contains both individual and place level variables. Both 
static and dynamic models of employment choice are estimated that control for unobserved 
individual effects. In addition, we estimate our models separately for a sub-sample of TANF 
recipients living in public housing, whose residential locations can be considered exogenously 
determined. 
 Besides addressing self-selection, our paper improves on previous studies in a number 
of respects. First, we estimate the TANF recipient’s access to jobs at the block-group level 
quarterly, which provides a level of geographic and chronological detail not previously used. 
Second, we combine characteristics of the individual, the case, and the place (neighborhood and 
job access) in a single estimation where the relative importance of these factors can be 
established. Finally, the dynamic models we estimate are based on the dynamic nonlinear 
random effects approach recently proposed by Wooldridge (2005). This approach provides 
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practical solutions to the initial conditions problem in nonlinear panel data models, such as the 
dynamic unobserved effects probit model employed in our empirical application. 
We find strong evidence of positive state dependence and unobserved heterogeneity in 
the full-time employment participation behavior of welfare recipients.  There is also substantial 
evidence that individual and family characteristics are important determinants of the 
employment probability of welfare recipients. The age and education of the recipient and the 
number of children and adults in her family are all found to be important. Space (neighborhood 
effects and job access), on the other hand, is found to be relatively unimportant. This confirms 
the findings of other recent studies that have focused on the employment of welfare recipients. 
The next section provides background followed by a description of the data and the 
variables in Section 3.  Section 4 details the estimation strategy and section 5 presents our 
results broken down by race.  Section 6 presents our findings for a sub-sample of public housing 
residents and Section 7 concludes.  
 
2. Background 
 There are two hypotheses that relate the employment probability of low skill workers to 
their residential locations – the spatial mismatch hypothesis (SMH) and the neighborhood 
effects hypothesis (NEH). The SMH, introduced by Kain in 1968, states that job 
suburbanization has reduced the employment opportunities of central city low- skill residents, 
because they have been unable to shift their labor supply from the central city to the suburbs. 
While Kain (1968) attributed this lack of a supply response to racial discrimination with the 
suburban housing market, others have argued that other factors also play a role, including 
suburban land use controls, lack of knowledge of suburban job openings, and the failure of 
public transportation to meet the needs of reverse commuters (Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist, 1998). 
 Under the rubric of “neighborhood effects” falls a variety of mechanisms that link the 
neighborhood milieu to individual behaviors and opportunities. Examples include peer group 
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influences, role model effects, and informal sources of job market information. While many 
other examples could be identified (see Ellen and Turner (1997) for a complete listing), the 
basic idea is well known – poor neighborhoods result in individual behaviors that are 
detrimental to both the person and society (Wilson, 1987).  
 Turning first to the empirical evidence on the SMH, it can be said that this evidence is 
quite extensive and generally supports the conclusion that the relatively low earnings and 
employment of less-educated minorities are partially attributable to their poor accessibility to 
suburban jobs.2 However, the SMH literature has focused on males rather than females and on 
youth instead of adults. The concentration on males can be explained by their worse labor 
market outcomes and the belief that these outcomes are related to their high rate of incarceration 
and to high crime rates within central cities. These factors also help to explain the popularity of 
studying youth, but youth also provide a convenient approach to dealing with self-selection. The 
argument is commonly made that for youth still living at home residential location can be 
treated as exogenously determined by their parents or guardians.3  
 Because welfare recipients tend to have unique employment problems (for example, 
limited recent job experience and childcare needs), the results of spatial mismatch studies that 
have not focused specifically on them may not be applicable to them. In recognition of this, two 
recent studies investigate whether the SMH applies to TANF recipients.4 Allard and Danziger 
(2002) use administrative data on welfare receipt and job location data from the Multi-City 
Study of Urban Inequality to examine the relationship between access to jobs and the 
employment probability of TANF recipients living in Detroit. Their logit employment models 
are estimated for two separate cross-sectional snapshots – June, 1996 and June, 1998, and 
                                                 
2 For reviews of the SMH literature see Holzer (1991), Kain (1992), and Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist (1998). 
All three reviews conclude that the SMH is supported by existing evidence. 
3 Focusing on youth is not above reproach. If children share behavioral characteristics with their parents 
(either due to nature or nurture), omitted productivity characteristics in equations estimated for youth may 
still be correlated with measures of neighborhood job opportunity. 
4 Although the emphasis of these studies is on the SMH, they also provide evidence on the NEH. 
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include dummy variables for three age categories, whether the recipient had less than a high 
school degree, the number of people in the household (three or fewer, six or more), and county 
of residence. Neighborhood effects are measured by the poverty rate of the recipient’s census 
tract. Two job accessibility variables are included together in all estimated models – the total 
number of nearby jobs per adult in 1997 and the change in the latter variable between 1992 and 
1997. From their results Allard and Danziger conclude that improvements in job access increase 
the employment of TANF recipients; however, there are some inconsistencies in their estimates. 
While their access variable based on employment levels is positive and statistically significant 
for both whites and nonwhites, their job change based measure of access is positive and 
significant only for whites. For nonwhites it is insignificant for the June 1996 snapshot and 
negative and significant for the 1998 snapshot. For reasons outlined below, job access for 
welfare recipients is best measured using job changes rather than job levels. Hence, this racial 
difference in their results is perplexing. One possible explanation, however, is that white 
welfare recipients have relatively greater residential choice, because they encounter less 
discriminatory treatment in the housing market. This greater choice may result in self-selection 
causing a larger upward bias in the estimated effect of job access for whites in comparison to 
nonwhites. Their neighborhood effects indicator (poverty rate of the census tract) has the 
expected negative effect on employment and is statistically significant in three of their four 
regressions, but the effect is inexplicitly positive and significant for nonwhites in 1996.  
The second SMH study that focuses on TANF recipients is by Bania et al. (2003), who 
estimate logit employment models that are similar to those estimated by Allard and Danziger. 
As is true for the latter authors, Bania et al. use administrative data on TANF recipients (in their 
case for Cuyahoga County (Cleveland), Ohio for the year 1996), but their job location data are 
obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau’s data file County Business Patterns. Their measure of 
neighborhood effects is again the poverty rate of the recipient’s census tract. Job access is 
measured as the number of projected entry-level jobs that could be reached in a 20 minute 
 8
commute by car or a 40 minute commute by public transit, with recipients assigned one of these 
two values depending upon whether they possessed a driver’s license. Control variables 
included the type, if any, of housing assistance being given to the recipient along with a set of 
demographic variables. No variable on the educational level of the recipient is included because 
this information was not available. 
 Bania et al. find that the employment probability of TANF recipients is not affected by 
either job access or the neighborhood poverty rate. Moreover, job access (but not the poverty 
rate) is also statistically insignificant in their models explaining the recipient’s level of (and 
change in) quarterly earnings. 
 Turning next to the NEH literature, the same problem that has plagued empirical 
investigations of the SMH – namely, endogenous residential location – limits what can be 
learned from existing studies.5 Moreover, we found no NEH studies that have focused on the 
employment of TANF recipients.6 The only evidence on neighborhood effects is therefore 
limited to what was reported above for the two SMH studies on TANF recipients. 
 The final literature that is relevant to our research are the studies based on the U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development’s demonstration “Moving to Opportunity” 
(MTO). In MTO public housing residents with children were eligible to participate in a lottery 
that randomly assigned them to one of three groups – a control group (remained in public 
housing), a Section 8 group (given a Section 8 voucher, without a location restriction), and an 
experimental group (received a Section 8 voucher that required finding housing within a census 
tract with low poverty (i.e., less than 10 percent)). While MTO was not limited to TANF 
recipients, a majority of the participants were receiving welfare at the time of assignment. The 
motivation behind MTO was that its randomized design would minimize bias resulting from the 
                                                 
5 For a review of the empirical evidence on the NEH, see Ihlanfeldt (1999). 
6 There are, however, two studies that have studied the influence of neighborhood residence on the 
probability of receiving welfare (Osterman, 1991; Vartanian, 1992). 
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self-selection of residential location. Results measured two years (Katz et al., 2001) and five 
years (Kling et al., 2004) after program entry show no statistically significant differences in 
employment or earnings between the control and experimental groups. These results suggest 
that nothing about place has an important effect on the labor market outcomes of housing 
assistance recipients.7 However, Kling et al. acknowledge that moving to a low poverty 
neighborhood may not always improve job accessibility. Hence, the MTO results are more 
damaging to the NEH than they are to the SMH (to the extent that the neighborhood poverty 
rate captures neighborhood effects). 
 In summary, only two studies have specifically addressed the importance of space in 
affecting the employment probability of TANF recipients. Both studies ignore self-selection of 
residential location. In addition, neither study controls for access to childcare, and only one of 
the two studies includes the education attainment of the recipient as an explanatory variable. 
The MTO has the advantage of addressing self-selection via random assignment, but it provides 
no direct evidence on the effect that job access has on TANF recipients’ employment 
probability. Below we describe the models that we estimate, which address each of the above 
criticisms of earlier work. 
 
3. Data  
 To construct our panel of the quarterly employment experience of TANF recipients, 
data were assembled from a variety of sources: The Georgia Department of Labor, the Georgia 
Department of Human Resources, and the U.S. Census Bureau. Geographic data were obtained 
using the Maptitude Geographic Information System, and from the Environmental Systems 
Research Institute. The panel includes all females living in the Atlanta MSA who were TANF 
case heads and 15 to 65 years old in the first quarter of 1999. Individuals were followed over 16 
                                                 
7 There were, however, significant differences between the control and experimental groups (that favored 
the experimental group) in measurements of the health of both adults and children. 
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quarters – from the first quarter of 1999 to the fourth quarter of 2002, regardless of whether they 
subsequently left welfare.8 For the 13,679 individuals included, quarterly data are available for 
an average of 15.7 quarters, resulting in a total of 215,255 observations. The racial breakdown 
of the recipients is 11,597 nonwhites and 2,082 whites.9 
3.1 Description of Variables 
 The variables comprising our panel are listed in Table 1 and are categorized in the table 
as dependent variable, individual characteristics, childcare accessibility, neighborhood and 
transit variables, accessibility measures to job growth and competing labor supply, and other 
controls. The individual variables included in each of these groups are described in turn below. 
 Our dependent variable is the full-time employment status of each individual for each 
quarter. Because hours worked are not available, quarterly wages are used to define full-time 
workers.10 A large proportion of the TANF case heads reported less than $100 in quarterly 
wages, indicating that these individuals were only marginally employed in the formal labor 
market. For this reason full-time employment status is used as our dependent variable rather 
than whether any work occurred. Working full-time is defined as earning a minimum of $2,000 
per quarter. This amounts to 30 hours per week at a real wage of $5.15 assuming a quarter 
length of 13 weeks. 
 Individual characteristics include age, age squared, whether the recipient graduated 
from high school, number of children under the age of 18, and whether welfare benefits had 
                                                 
8 Our panel begins in 1999 because the educational level of the recipient is not available for earlier years. 
The TANF data were provided by the Georgia Department of Human Resources. 
9 Nonwhites in Atlanta are overwhelmingly African-Americans: according to the 2000 Census, 77% of 
nonwhites are non-Hispanic African-Americans. 
10 Earnings data are obtained from the Individual Wage File collected by the Georgia Department of 
Labor, which contains quarterly wage information for all “covered” employees in the state of Georgia. A 
covered employee is defined as an employee for whom unemployment insurance is collected. The 
Individual Wage File also contains the ES202 employer identification number of the firm for which each 
individual works. The Individual Wage File is linked to the TANF administrative data via the social 
security number. 
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been received for eight consecutive quarters prior to the first quarter of 1999 (Longterm).11 The 
probability of full-time employment is expected to be higher for older, and therefore more 
experienced individuals and for those with a high school degree. Longterm is included to 
account for unobserved individual characteristics, such as the individual’s mental and physical 
health, that may reduce her employment probability. Because of their greater family demands, 
TANF recipients with more children are expected to be less likely to obtain or maintain full-
time employment. 
 Childcare accessibility is measured by two variables – one to account for access to 
formal childcare (Ccemp) and the other to account for the availability of informal childcare 
(Informal). Ccemp equals the number of childcare workers working in the individual’s 
neighborhood.12 Although there are inherent difficulties in measuring the availability of 
informal childcare provided outside the household, the potential availability of informal 
childcare within the household is likely best measured by the presence of other adults within the 
household, since this allows for task specialization. Informal therefore registers whether there 
are two or more adults in the case.13  
 The neighborhood and transit variables include the poverty rate of the individual’s 
block group (Povrate), whether the individual resides within a quarter of a mile of a transit line 
(Transitqm), and whether the individual lives in public housing (Pubh). Following Allard and 
Danziger and Bania et al., we use the poverty rate to measure neighborhood effects. 14,15 Public 
                                                 
11 Individual and case-level characteristics of TANF recipients, including addresses, are obtained from the 
TANF administrative data that are collected by the Georgia Department of Human Resources. 
12 For Ccemp and all other neighborhood variables the census block group is used as the neighborhood 
unit. Ccemp is constructed from the file ES202 Firm-Level Employment Data, which was provided by the 
Georgia Department of Labor. This file contains 4-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) numbers 
identifying the specific industry of the firm along with quarterly employment levels and the establishment 
address.  
13 While other adults in the household may be a source of informal childcare, they may also require care 
themselves, especially if they are elderly. We do not expect however, that this situation arises so 
frequently that it undermines the usefulness of Informal as a measure of access to informal childcare. 
14 Unlike these earlier studies, however, we use the block group rather than the census tract as the 
neighborhood. Because of Atlanta’s relatively low population density, census tracts are large even within 
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transit is considered accessible if it is within a quarter mile, because evidence indicates that 
most people will not use transit if they must walk a longer distance (Bernick and Carroll, 1991; 
Cervero, 1994; Untermann, 1984).16 The dummy variable for public housing residents is 
included because for them the relevant neighborhood is best described as the project itself rather 
than the entire block group. 
 A central focus of our study is to determine whether the TANF recipient’s proximity to 
job opportunity affects her probability of full-time employment. The job opportunity afforded to 
a TANF recipient living in a particular neighborhood depends on the number of nearby job 
vacancies (henceforth referred to as job access) in comparison to the number of workers 
competing for these vacancies (henceforth referred to as the competing labor supply). The 
maximum commuting area of the TANF recipient is assumed to be larger than the home 
neighborhood but smaller than the entire metropolitan area; hence, job opportunity varies across 
neighborhoods.  
 Ideally, data on job openings by skill level and location would be available for 
constructing the job access measure. In the absence of such data, we draw upon internal labor 
market theory to justify using the quarterly change in jobs to identify jobs suitable for welfare 
recipients.17 Internal labor markets refer to the practice of firms filling more skilled positions 
from within the ranks of current employees in order to minimize hiring costs. Hiring done 
outside the firm is only a certain low-level “points of entry”.18 To account explicitly for distance 
                                                                                                                                               
the central city (on average 1.22 square miles). Block groups therefore represent a more meaningful 
spatial unit for defining what most people think of as a neighborhood. 
15 The unemployment rate, labor force nonparticipation rate, and racial composition of the neighborhood 
were also used to measure neighborhood effects. Due to their co-linearity with the poverty rate and 
general lack of statistical significance, these variables were ultimately dropped from the analysis. All 
census block group variables come from the 2000 Census of Population. 
16 The public transit variable is constructed from public transit base maps, along with a geographic 
information system.  
17 The quarterly change in jobs is measured at the block group level using the ES202 data set described 
above. 
18 Our job access variable is also based on Raphael (1998), who concludes after empirical 
experimentation with alternative job access variables that those based on employment change are superior 
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in our job access measure, more distant job changes are discounted using a distance decay 
function: 
 ACCESSi = ∑=
=
J  j
1  j
 CHANGEj  *  exp (- γdij ),        (1) 
where CHANGEj represents the growth in the number of jobs from the previous quarter in 
block group j; dij is the distance in miles between the centroids of block groups i and j; and γ is 
the “distance-decay” function.19 ACCESS is a gravitational potential measure of proximity 
(Isard, 1960)  that places less weight on relatively distant employment opportunities. Weighting 
opportunities by distance is based on the assumptions that information on jobs declines with 
distance and that workers base their employment decisions on offer wages net of commuting 
costs.20 
 ACCESS captures spatial variation in the demand for labor, but it does not account for 
geographical variation in labor supply. The latter is important to measure because TANF 
recipients are concentrated in areas that tend to be densely populated with individuals who, like 
themselves, are relatively undereducated and therefore potential competitors for available jobs. 
To measure competing labor supply, we employ the same distance-decay function as before:  
 LFCOMPETEi = ∑=
=
J  j
1  j
 SUPPLYj * exp (- γdij ),                                        (2) 
where SUPPLYj equals the number of adults living in block group j possessing no more than a 
high school degree. 
                                                                                                                                               
to those based on employment levels in explaining inter-neighborhood differences in youth employment 
rates. 
19 ACCESS uses an exponential deterrence functional form based on Isard et al. (1998), who conclude 
that this form is superior to the power function when focusing on commutes or relatively short distances. 
After experimentation with a range of values, γ = 1 was selected because it provided the greatest 
explanatory power. However, our conclusions regarding the importance of job access to employment 
probability are not dependent on the choice of γ. 
20 ACCESS is also computed separately for each major SIC grouping. As reported below, separate 
models are estimated using the all-jobs ACCESS variable and ACCESS variables broken down by 
industry group. 
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 The additional control variables entering our models include dummy variables for time 
period (year-quarter) and for the recipient’s county of residence. In Georgia TANF is 
administered at the county level; hence, differences in employment probability may exist across 
counties due to differences in program administration (e.g., some counties may provide more 
help than others to the recipient in her search for a job). The Atlanta MSA contains 20 counties, 
with Fulton County being the central county. Preliminary runs including a full set of county 
variables (Fulton is the reference) revealed that for nonwhites county effects are accounted for 
by including dummy variables for the inner suburban counties of Clayton and Dekalb and 
dummy variables grouping the 17 remaining counties into those south (8 counties) and north (9 
counties) of Interstate 20. For whites, Fulton (again the reference) and Clayton Counties are 
separately represented, but Dekalb is included among the southern counties. 
 Table 1 also distinguishes the variables that are time-varying from those that are time-
constant. Intertemporal variation in the time-varying variables comes from variation without the 
recipient moving in the case of Age, Children, Ccemp, Informal, Access, and Lfcompete. 
Variation in the latter four variables also comes from relocation. For the variables Povrate and 
Pubh variation comes only from relocation. The time-constant variables are Hsgrad and 
Longterm. 
3.2  Summary Statistics 
 Table 2 contains summary statistics for all of the variables broken down by the race of 
the recipient. On average, about 25 percent of the recipients are employed full time during any 
given quarter, regardless of race. The typical recipient is nonwhite in her middle thirties and 
lacks a high school diploma. Half of the whites and 67 percent of the nonwhites are long-term 
recipients of welfare benefits. Family structure also differs between the races, with nonwhites 
having on average .5 more children than whites. There is, however, little difference in the 
proportion of cases with two or more adults present in the household. 
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 The residential locations of nonwhites and whites are markedly different. Nonwhite 
recipients are much more centrally located, with 62 percent living in the central county in 
comparison to only 10 percent of the whites. Given their centralization, it is not surprising that 
the neighborhoods of the nonwhites are characterized by inferior job access, greater competition 
for jobs, and a higher poverty rate (almost three times higher). Nonwhites are also about four 
times more likely to live in public housing than whites. However, the neighborhoods of 
nonwhites do offer two advantages over those occupied by whites – access to childcare and to 
public transit are better in the nonwhites’ neighborhoods. 
 
4. Empirical Methodology 
We explain the employment status of individual TANF recipient i during quarter t in 
terms of job accessibility, labor market competition, neighborhood characteristics, and 
individual characteristics. The generic model for employment choice is specified as  
     * 1 2 3 4 5 6 ,it it it it it it it i itE Z L A C G Wβ β β β β β ν ε= + + + + + + +                                (3) 
                      (i = 1,…N;  t = 1,…,T; n = NT) 
                Eit  = I( *itE   > 0),                                                                                           (4) 
where *itE  is the latent variable reflecting the benefits of full time employment; Eit is a 0-1 
dummy variable with 1 indicating the individual is employed full time; the vector Z consists of 
the set of  individual- and case-level (family) characteristics; L is the measure of labor market 
competition from (2); A denotes  either a single aggregate measure  of job access or  a vector of 
industry-based measures of access constructed as in (1); C are the childcare accessibility 
variables; P is the neighborhood poverty rate; and W is a vector of other control variables, 
including access to public transit, county effects,  and calendar time effects. Here, 
( )1 6,...,β β β ′′ ′= denotes a vector of unknown parameters associated with ( ),...,it it itX Z W= .  
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The νi are the individual effects which reflect unobserved recipient-specific characteristics, and 
εit are the typical error terms.   
 To estimate (3), we employ a version of Chamberlain’s random effects probit model 
(CRE) that allows unobserved effects to be correlated with all of our time-varying independent 
variables.21 Specifically, it is assumed that iν  is related to elements of Xi  by  
                  ,i i iXν ϕ α η= + +                                                                                                  (5)  
where 
1
1 T
i it
t
X X
T =
= ∑ and iη , conditional on iX , is distributed as normal (0, 2ησ ).22 The random 
component itε , conditional on both iX  and iν , is assumed to follow the normal distribution. The 
primary advantage of our CRE model is that by allowing iν  and the place-based variables to be 
correlated, we are controlling for the self-selection of residential location. 
 In addition to unobserved individual effects, current employment may depend on the 
TANF recipient’s past employment experience.  To the extent that search costs are involved in 
labor force participation and employment opportunities differ according to the individual’s 
employment status, the TANF recipient’s labor force participation decision may depend on her 
previous employment experience. We therefore also estimate a dynamic model of employment 
choice that allows for state dependence: 
            * 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 ,it it it it it it it it i itE E Z L A C G Wρ β β β β β β ν ε−= + + + + + + + +                     (6)   
                                                 
21 For discussion of CRE and related models see Hsiao (2003). An alternative estimator of (3) is the fixed 
effects logit model. This estimator assumes that employment outcomes Ei = (Ei1…EiT) are independent 
conditional on the observed and unobserved characteristics Xi = (Xi1…AiT) and  iν . We chose not to use 
this model because it only estimates the effects of time-varying explanatory variables and does not allow 
for the estimation of partial effects.  The model also results in loss of  information because individual 
observations with the same employment experience overtime (e.g.,  recipient employed during all 
quarters)  do not contribute to  the estimation.  
22 As noted in the previous section, a number of our independent variables are time-constant. While these 
variables can be included in our models, we cannot distinguish their effects from iν  unless we assume 
that iν  is uncorrelated with these variables. 
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Eit  = I( *itE   > 0) 
(i = 1,…N;  t = 1,…,T) 
where Eit-1 is the participation state variable and ρ is the state dependence parameter.  The 
estimation of model (6) requires specification of the error components and the initial conditions 
of the dynamic process.  Using the probit specification, we have  
              
( )
( )
( )
1 0
1 1 2 3 4 5 6
1
1| ,..., , ,
,
it it i i i
it it it it it it it i
it it i
P E E E X
E Z L A C G W
E X
ν
ρ β β β β β β ν
ρ β ν
−
−
−
=
= Φ + + + + + + +
= Φ + +
                (7) 
where ( )aΦ denotes the standard normal distribution function, evaluated at a.  
In order to estimate (7), we adopt the dynamic nonlinear random effects approach 
recently proposed by Wooldridge (2005). The approach provides practical solutions to the 
initial conditions problem in nonlinear individual effects models.  In particular, in the context of 
dynamic probit with unobserved heterogeneity, the estimation method provides a strategy for 
computing average partial effects.    
Analogous to specification (5), the random effects are assumed to be normally 
distributed, conditional on a linear function of the explanatory variables and the initial 
employment state, Ei0.   In particular, 
      0 ,i i i iE Xν ϕ γ α η= + + +                                                                                 (8)              
where  ( ) ( )20| , ~ 0,i i iE X N ηη σ . The initial  time period t = 0 corresponds to 1999:Q1 so that 
the initial fulltime employment status dummy is Ei0. The ensuing mixture density of 
( )1,...,i iTE E given ( )0 ,i iE X  provides the basis for maximum likelihood estimation of the 
unknown parameters; see Wooldridge (2005) for further details.23    
                                                 
23 In implementation, we employ 12 to 16-point Gauss-Hermite quadrature, and determine that the 
quadrature procedure is stable in our application. 
 18
 In our dynamic probit model we allow iν  to be correlated with Lfcompete, Access, and 
Informal in all time periods. For the other time-varying variables iν  depends on the over time 
mean.24 
The average partial effects are based on the estimator of  
              ( ) ( ){ }1/ 221 0E 1it it i iE X E X ηρ β ϕ γ α σ −−⎡ ⎤Φ + + + + ⋅ +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ,                                     (9)  
where expectation is taken with respect to the distribution of  ( )0 , .i iE X   We follow 
Wooldridge (2005) and replace the expected value in (9) with the sample average over 
individuals, evaluated at the parameter estimates.  
 Consistent estimation of the above models requires the assumption of strict exogeneity 
of the regressors (Wooldridge 2002). This assumption is violated if employment status has an 
effect on current or future values of the explanatory variables. One possible source of reverse 
causation is that having a job may cause some recipients to move to get closer to work. If this is 
the case then estimates of the effect of job access on employment probability will be upwardly 
biased. This represents a second type of bias that results from the self-selection of residential 
location. Recall from above that the first type we have identified occurs when unobserved 
individual effects affect both residential location and employment. One approach toward a 
complete attenuation of both types of selection bias is to use a subsample of recipients whose 
locations are randomly assigned and who are unlikely to move to get closer to work. Such a 
subsample is formed by using only those recipients living in public housing. Individuals who 
apply for public housing are assigned to their units based upon the housing requirements of their 
families and current availability. There is therefore minimal self-selection. In addition, once an 
                                                 
24 We do not allow iν  to depend on all of the time-varying variables in all time periods in order to 
conserve on degrees of freedom. However, our results are unchanged if  iν  is allowed to be correlated in 
each time period with variables other than Lfcompete, Access, and Informal. 
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individual acquires a public housing unit she is unlikely to sacrifice the unit in order to get 
closer to work. 
 Estimation is carried out for public housing residents as well as for the regular sample 
of TANF recipients. Models are estimated separately by race, nonwhites and whites. The 
sensitivity of the results to different specifications of the control variables and to different panel 
data estimators is explored. 
 
5.  Estimation Results  
This section presents the results from estimating various specifications of the static 
probit model that allows for individual effects but no state dependence and the dynamic probit 
model, which incorporates state dependence for employment status as well as individual 
heterogeneity.  The dependent variable is a binary variable indicating full-time employment 
status as defined earlier in Section 3. 
Tables 3 and 4 present sets of estimates from the CRE and dynamic probit models, 
respectively. Note that Table 3 contains the names of the explanatory variables (e.g. Access) and 
the variable names with the letter “b” appended (e.g., Accessb). Table 4 also contains b 
appended variables, but for select variables (Lfcompete, Access, and Informal) variable names 
appear which are appended with numbers (e.g., Access1 – Access15).25 The estimated 
coefficient reported for an appended variable name allows for correlation between the 
unobserved individual effect ( iν ) and the variable. Those appended with a b allow correlation 
between iν  and the over time average of the variable. Those appended with the numbers 1 to 15 
allow correlation between  iν  and the variable in all time periods.26 As noted above, in the CRE 
models we allow iν  to be correlated with the over time mean of each of the time-varying 
                                                 
25 Complete sets of results for the dynamic probit models are reported in Appendix Table A1.   
26 The estimated coefficients on these variables also enter the formula used to calculate average partial 
effects, see (9) and (10). 
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explanatory variables. In the dynamic probit models we allow iν  to be correlated with 
Lfcompete, Access, and Informal in all time periods. For the other time-varying variables iν  
depends on the over time mean. Although we present the CRE probit estimates for comparison, 
in our discussion of the results we highlight those obtained from the preferred dynamic probit 
model..27 
The results show that employment participation is characterized by highly significant 
positive state dependence (its magnitude is considered below) and unobserved heterogeneity. In 
all CRE and dynamic probit specifications, the variance of the individual effect is tightly 
estimated.  Allowing for state dependence has a substantial effect on the estimated unobserved 
heterogeneity: on average, the proportion of the total variance due to the individual effect 
(labeled τ in the tables) falls from about 0.75 in the CRE model to about 0.45 in the dynamic 
probit model. The results from the dynamic probit model show that the initial employment 
status is also quite important, and implies that there is significant correlation between recipient-
specific unobserved heterogeneity and the initial employment condition. 
The estimated coefficients on the appended variable names reveal that a number of the 
place-based variables have statistically significant correlations with iν . These include Povrate 
and Access in the CRE models and Access in the dynamic probit models for both whites and 
nonwhites. These results underscore the importance of controlling for the self-selection of 
residential location in testing the SMH and NEH as they apply to TANF recipients. 
Estimation results also demonstrate a substantial difference between nonwhite and 
white recipients with regard to the effects of the independent variables in this large urban area.  
Next, we discuss the effects of each group of independent variables on participation in fulltime 
employment.   
                                                 
27  Estimation results from dynamic probit are based on balanced panel data of  15 quarters, 1999:Q2 – 
2002:Q4.  The initial time period t = 0 corresponds to 1999:Q1, with initial employment status Ei0 
denoted by Ftemploy0 in the tables. 
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Individual Characteristics 
TANF recipients with more children are expected to be less likely to obtain or maintain 
full-time employment because of family demands or negative workforce characteristics 
associated with dependent family members (e.g., increased worker absenteeism).  Estimates 
from the dynamic and CRE probit specifications indicate that both whites and nonwhites have a 
lower probability of full-time employment as the number of children in the household increases, 
and the estimated effects are significant at the .05 level; however, the effect is substantially 
larger for whites than for nonwhites.   
 Age and its square are included to proxy for experience.28  The expectation is that, as 
the individual ages, she gains experience and is more likely to be employed.  For non-whites in 
the CRE specification, coefficients on Age and Agesquared have the expected signs and are 
statistically significant; however, the effects of age on the probability of full-time employment 
have statistically insignificant effects for both whites and nonwhites in the dynamic probit 
model.   
All that is known about the educational attainment of the recipient is whether or not she 
completed high school. The results show that both whites and nonwhites that completed high 
school are more likely than non-completers to be employed full-time, with each of the effects 
significant at the .01 level in the dynamic probit model.29 
The binary variable Longterm is included to account for unobserved negative individual 
characteristics that may affect employability. The estimated effect of Longterm is consistently 
negative and significant for both whites and nonwhites. The strong, negative effects of 
Longterm indicate that unobserved characteristics related to longer welfare spells do reduce the 
probability of employment. These results also underscore the importance of unobserved 
                                                 
28 For the dynamic probit model, we include age of the welfare recipient in 1999 quarter 2. 
29 Because education is a time-constant variable in our models, care should be taken in interpreting its 
estimated effect.  As noted above, to distinguish its effect from iν  the assumption is required that the two 
variables are independently distributed. 
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individual heterogeneity in explaining differences in the employment probability of the 
recipients. 
Childcare Accessibility 
 Access to informal childcare (Informal) is positive and statistically significant for both 
whites and nonwhites in the CRE models, but is significant for only nonwhites in the dynamic 
probit. However, the interaction between informal childcare access and the number of children 
is statistically significant for whites in the dynamic probit model, which indicates that with 
more children having two or more adults in the household increases the probability of full-time 
employment. In contrast to the results obtained for Informal, access to formal childcare within 
the home neighborhood (Ccemp) is never significant in any of the models.  
Neighborhood and Transit Variables 
 As in prior studies, we measure neighborhood effects by including the poverty rate of 
the recipient’s neighborhood as a regressor. In all cases, the estimated effects are statistically 
insignificant.30 It is worth noting that we obtain very different results from estimating a cross-
sectional model. Using the values of all of the variables for the first quarter of 2001, probit 
model estimates show that the neighborhood poverty rate has a negative and highly significant 
effect on the full-time employment probability of both whites and nonwhites. The contrasting 
results obtained from the cross-sectional models in comparison to those yielded by our panel 
data models suggest that ignoring the self-selection of residential location causes biased 
estimates of the importance of neighborhood effects on the probability of employment. 
 The other variables included in this group of variables are dummy variables indicating 
whether the recipient lives in public housing and whether she resides within a quarter mile of a 
                                                 
30 In their review of the neighborhood effects literature, Ellen and Turner (1997) note that a number of 
studies have found that the neighborhood poverty rate only affects individual behaviors above a certain 
threshold. This threshold is commonly defined as a poverty rate of 40 percent. We therefore also ran our 
models with a dummy variable for whether the neighborhood poverty rate exceeded 40 percent. This 
variable is also not significant in any of the cases. 
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public transit line. Neither of these variables is found to affect the employment probability of 
either whites or nonwhites. We also tried interacting the transit and job access variables, based 
on the expectation that transit matters more when commutes are shorter. These interactions are 
also not significant. Our public transit results have a direct bearing on the debate surrounding 
the transportation needs of welfare recipients. 
 The U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development recently completed its 
“Bridges to Work” (BTW) demonstration project (Roder and Scrivner, 2005).  This project was 
designed to connect inner-city job seekers to suburban jobs by providing improved public 
transportation services to project participants. Comparisons between the labor market outcomes 
of workers randomly assigned to experimental and control groups revealed that these 
transportation services had no effect on earnings or employment. This held true for low-skilled 
workers generally and for those participants who were TANF recipients. These findings are 
consistent with our results showing that having public transit within walking distance does not 
increase employment probability. Surveys conducted with the BTW participants indicated that 
the transportation services failed to improve outcomes because commuting times were 
intolerably long. An unresolved question is whether shorter commutes would result in improved 
transportation making a difference. The insignificance of our interaction variables support a 
“no” answer to this question.  
 Another finding of BTW is that having a driver’s license is associated with greater 
wages and annual earnings. This same result is reported by Bania et al. (2003), who find a 
license improves both the earnings and employment of Cleveland’s TANF recipients. While the 
direction of causality is unclear, these findings when combined with ours suggest that TANF 
recipients may need more flexible transportation than that provided by public transit in order to 
meet both their childcare and work requirements. 
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Job Accessibility and Competing Labor Supply 
 As anticipated, the estimated coefficients on our measure of job accessibility (Access) 
are in all cases positive. In the CRE models, the Access coefficient is statistically significant at 
.10 level for nonwhites, but it is not significant for whites. Neither of the coefficients is 
significant in the dynamic probit models at conventional levels by a two-tailed test. However, 
we have a clear sign hypothesis (+) for the Access variable; hence, it is worth noting that for 
nonwhites it is statistically significant at the .10 level using a one-tailed test. Our measure of the 
competing labor supply (Lfcompete) is also never significant using a two-tailed test, but it is 
negative (as expected) and significant at the .10 level for whites in the dynamic probit model by 
a one-tailed test. 
 Models were also estimated with Access measured separately for the four industry 
groups most likely to hire TANF recipients – Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate (FIRE), 
Retail, Services and Manufacturing.31 For nonwhites these variables are never statistically 
significant. The results for whites, once again, underscore the importance of controlling for the 
self-selection of residential location. Proximity to retail jobs consistently has a positive effect on 
the employment probability of whites, but the significance level of this effect declines as better 
control is obtained for individual unobserved heterogeneity. Retail access is significant at the 
.05 level in a simple cross sectional model, at the .10 in the CRE model, and at the .35 level in 
the dynamic probit model. 
Estimated Average Responses  
 To illustrate the magnitudes of employment responses to changes in job accessibility, 
childcare, number of children and state dependence, we report the estimated average partial 
                                                 
31 The industry groups most likely to hire welfare recipients were determined by using the Public Use 
Micro-data Sample for the Atlanta MSA to estimate the percentage of the jobs within each major industry 
group held by welfare recipients. 
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effects.32  From equation (9), the estimated APEs can be obtained by averaging out unobserved 
heterogeneity iν :  
              ? ? ? ? ?( ) ?( ) 1/ 221 0
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where parameters have been replaced with their maximum likelihood estimates and again Eit 
denotes Ftemployit.  
 The average partial effects for selected periods are shown in Table 5, broken 
down by race and key time-varying explanatory variables. The estimate of state dependence is 
substantial for both whites and nonwhites.  As compared to a case head not employed full-time 
in the previous quarter, for a TANF case head fully employed in the last quarter, the estimated 
increase in the probability of being employed in the current quarter is about .32 regardless of 
race.  
The average response to an additional child is about -.01 for whites and -.004 for 
nonwhites.  The availability of informal childcare increases the probability of full-time 
employment by about .06 for nonwhites and .03 for whites.  Increasing job accessibility by one 
standard deviation raises the probability of employment by about .002 for both racial groups. 
For whites, an increase of one standard deviation in our measure of the competing labor supply 
decreases the probability of employment by about .02.  Generally, the average responses are 
remarkably similar over time.    
 
6.  Results for Public Housing Residents  
 Table 6 gives summary statistics for the subsample of nonwhite TANF recipients 
residing in public housing.33 Because public housing within the Atlanta MSA is highly 
concentrated within the central county, only a dummy variable for Fulton County is included to 
                                                 
32 APEs can only be estimated for time-varying variables. We only report APEs for those variables that 
are statistically significant (or approach significance) at conventional levels. 
33 There are too few observations of white residents in public housing for meaningful estimation. 
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control for county effects. As compared to the overall nonwhite sample of TANF recipients, the 
public housing residents are younger, have more children, fare worse in terms of employment 
and educational attainment, and are more likely to be long-term welfare recipients. 
 The evidence presented in Table 4 for all nonwhite recipients provides weak support for 
the SMH in that Access is statistically significant by a one-tailed test. However, we have noted 
that this estimate may be upwardly biased if recipients with jobs move closer to where Access is 
higher in order to reduce the length of their commutes. Given the excess demand and 
correspondingly long waits that exist for public housing apartments, we expect that recipients 
with jobs living in public housing will not sacrifice their apartments in order to get closer to 
work. Hence, there should be no upward bias in the estimated effect of Access for public 
housing residents. 
 Table 7 gives results for the nonwhite TANF recipients living in public housing using 
the CRE model (first two columns) and the dynamic probit model (last two columns). In both 
models Access is less statistically significant than in the models estimated for the full sample of 
recipients. Most importantly, it is highly insignificant in the dynamic probit model.34 
 The rest of the results for the public housing residents mirror those obtained for the full 
sample: 1) state dependence, initial employment status, and unobserved heterogeneity are 
statistically significant, and 2) Informal, Longterm, and Hsgrad again all have strong effects on 
employment probability. There are two cases where the results do differ – 1) the age variables 
are significant for the public housing residents but are not significant for the full sample, and 2) 
the number of children is not significant for the public housing residents, but it is negative and 
significant for the full sample. 
                                                 
34 It is curious, however, that the results also show that Access is correlated with iν . This is not expected 
if location assignments are truly random.  In fact, assignments depend on family size, which may cause 
some correlation between Access and iν  if larger apartments are not spatially random. 
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Table 8 gives average partial effects for the nonwhite recipients living in public 
housing. The APEs of Lfcompete and Children are not reported since the underlying coefficient 
estimates are highly insignificant.35 The estimated effect of state dependence  (about .29) is 
slightly less than in the dynamic model estimated for the full sample.   For Informal, the 
estimated increase in employment probability of about .067 shows that nonwhite public housing 
residents are approximately 0.5% more likely to be employed full-time in the presence of 
informal childcare than are nonwhites in the full sample of TANF recipients. A one standard 
deviation increase in job access increases the probability of employment by about .001, which is 
roughly in line with the APE estimated for the full sample. 
 
7.  Conclusions   
 In recent years, the role that intra-metropolitan residential location plays in explaining 
the relatively low earnings and employment of minorities has been hotly debated. The two main 
hypotheses that relate location to economic opportunity are the spatial mismatch hypothesis and 
the neighborhood effects hypothesis. Based on the evidence that had accumulated over the years 
supporting these hypotheses, it was generally felt space would have a strong effect on welfare 
recipients’ labor market outcomes. However, recent studies that have focused specifically on 
TANF recipients have produced results that fail to provide much support for either the SMH or 
the NEH. Two of these studies (Allard and Danziger, 2002; Bania et al., 2003) rely upon non-
experimental methods, while the MTO demonstration is based on a random assignment 
experiment. A limitation of the non-experimental studies is that they ignore the self-selection of 
residential location. While the MTO is specifically designed to handle this issue, the treatment 
is the neighborhood poverty rate and not job accessibility. 
                                                 
35 Although not significant, we report an APE for job access so its magnitude can be compared to the 
APE estimated for the full sample. 
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 In this paper we have exploited a unique panel of the quarterly employment experiences 
of TANF recipients living within the Atlanta MSA. Our data allowed us to estimate dynamic 
discrete choice specifications of the full-time employment decisions of the recipients. The 
estimated models provide strong control for unobserved individual effects. Moreover, even 
stronger control for these effects is provided by the models we estimate for TANF recipients 
residing in public housing. We find strong evidence of positive state dependence and 
unobserved individual heterogeneity. 
 For both white and nonwhite recipients we find little support for either the SMH or the 
NEH. While space may matter to other disadvantaged workers, it does not seem to be important 
to the employment probability of welfare recipients. What does seem to matter, according to our 
results, are the individual and family characteristics of the recipient, both observed and 
unobserved. The observed variables that matter are the age and education of the recipient and 
the number of children and adults in her family. The strength of the effects estimated for 
unobserved individual heterogeneity, initial employment status, and long-term usage of public 
assistance underscore the importance of unobserved individual characteristics on employment 
probability. 
 While we find no evidence in support of space as an important determinant of recipient 
employment, our results should not be construed to imply that space is inconsequential to the 
overall well-being of the recipient. In addition to possibly beneficial non-employment effects, 
neighborhoods with less poverty and nearby job opportunities may provide long-run 
improvements in employment probability not captured by our results. 
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Table 1:  List and Description of Variables Used in Estimation of Employment Choice of 
TANF Recipients 
Variable Description 
Dependent Variables 
Ftemploy* = 1 if employed full time; 0 otherwise 
Individual Characteristics 
Age* Age in years 
Agesquared* Age in years squared 
Hsgrad = 1 if TANF recipient graduated high school 
Nonwhite = 1 if TANF recipient is non-white 
Longterm = 1 if the TANF recipient has received benefits for 8 consecutive quarters prior to 1999 quarter 1 
Children* Number of children under age 18  in the household 
Childcare Accessibility 
Ccemp* The number of childcare workers in the home census block group  
Informal* = 1 if there are two or more adults in the household (informal childcare availability) 
Neighborhood and Transit Variables 
Povrate* Poverty rate: Fraction of residents in the block group falling below the poverty line in 2000 
Transitqm*  = 1 if residing within a quarter mile of public transit line 
Pubh* = 1 if public housing resident 
Accessibility  Measures to Job Growth and Competing Labor Supply 
Access*  Proximity to job growth (see equation 1)  
Lfcompete* Proximity to other individuals over 25 years old with high school diploma or less (see equation 2) 
Other Controls 
Clayton*  = 1 if TANF recipient is residing in Clayton county 
Dekalb* = 1 if TANF recipient is residing in Dekalb county 
Fulton* = 1 if TANF recipient is residing in Fulton county (reference) 
I20South* = 1 if TANF recipient is residing in one of the counties south of I20 highway 
I20North* = 1 if TANF recipient is residing in one of the counties north of I20 highway 
Time effects  Dummy variables to control for calendar time effects (year-quarter) 
* Denotes time-varying variables.   
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics by Race (1999:Q1 to 2002:Q4 Unbalanced Panel) 
  White (Obs=32,288)a Nonwhite (Obs = 182,967)b 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent Variable 
Ftemploy 0.23 0.42 0 1 0.26 0.44 0 1
Individual Characteristics 
Age 38.43 11.48 16.19 64.99 35.27 10.70 16 65
Agesquared 1608.59 930.03 262.26 4223.22 1358.35 832.18 241.06 4223.93
Hsgrad 0.36 0.48 0 1 0.42 0.49 0 1
Longterm 0.52 0.50 0 1 0.67 0.47 0 1
Children  1.94 1.11 1 11 2.45 1.50 1 14
Access  to Job Growth and Competing Labor Supply 
Lfcompete 2365.18 2120.64 28.52 11179.80 5952.88 2933.91 50.17 11200.31
Access 7.98 188.83 -4683.11 4399.13 -37.71 422.30 -4805.66 4894.26
Childcare 
Ccemp 8.05 17.77 0.00 163.67 8.37 17.59 0.00 164.67
Informal 0.54 0.50 0 1 0.49 0.50 0 1
Neighborhood and Transit Variables 
Povrate 0.11 0.09 0.00 0.71 0.30 0.21 0.00 0.77
Transitqm 0.14 0.35 0 1 0.74 0.44 0 1
Pubh 0.05 0.22 0 1 0.19 0.39 0 1
Counties 
Clayton  0.13 0.34 0 1 0.07 0.26 0 1
Dekalb   0.15 0.36 0 1
Fulton  0.10 0.30 0 1 0.62 0.48 0 1
I20South 0.32 0.47 0 1 0.07 0.25 0 1
I20North 0.42 0.49 0 1 0.08 0.27 0 1
a There are 2082 white TANF recipients observed for min=2 quarters, max=16 quarters and average of  
15.5 quarters. 
b For unbalanced panel data of  nonwhites, there are 11,597 TANF recipients observed  for a minimum   
 of 2 quarters and maximum of 16 quarters, with average of 15.8 quarters per individual.    
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Table 3:  Results  from Chamberlain Random Effects Probit Modela 
  White (Obs=32288) Non-White (Obs=182967) 
Variable Coef t-stat Coef t-stat 
Age -0.19034 -0.78 0.22707* 1.79 
Agesquared -0.00433*** -9.75 -0.00422*** -21.22 
Hsgrad 0.06212 0.65 0.32682*** 8.48 
Longterm -0.45715*** -4.71 -0.39776*** -9.62 
Children -0.12424*** -3 -0.03792*** -3.42 
Lfcompete 0.00004 1.19 0.00000 0.73 
Access 0.00009 1.31 0.00002* 1.79 
Ccemp -0.00123 -0.67 0.00074 1.27 
Informal 0.44256*** 6.5 0.75398*** 30.41 
Informal*Children 0.03308 1.19 0.01316 1.59 
Povrate -0.31879 -0.55 -0.05468 -0.53 
Transitqm 0.12287 0.64 -0.05151 -1.01 
Pubh 0.03813 0.19 0.0017 0.04 
Clayton 0.14688 0.56 0.02662 0.34 
Dekalb   -0.06468 -1.13 
I20South 0.63820** 2.27 -0.32010*** -2.77 
I20North 0.48702* 1.82 -0.16800* -1.68 
Agebb 0.19818 0.81 -0.21500* -1.68 
Agesquaredb 0.00429*** 7.57 0.00405*** 16.04 
Childrenb -0.03033 -0.4 -0.05740** -2.31 
Lfcompeteb 0.00000 0.04 -0.00001 -0.94 
Accessb 0.00222** 2.1 0.00074** 2.44 
Ccempb -0.00192 -0.57 0.00009 0.07 
Informalb -0.08952 -0.32 0.44405*** 3.72 
Informal*Childrenb 0.25282** 2.2 0.12817*** 3.16 
Transitqmb -0.33055 -1.15 -0.07534 -0.8 
Pubhb 0.00904 0.03 -0.11505 -1.48 
Claytonb -0.58600 -1.64 -0.17370 -1.37 
Dekalbb -0.17687** -2.12 
I20Southb -0.99703*** -2.77 0.14744 0.94 
I20Northb -0.65344* -1.93 -0.03532 -0.26 
Constant -2.88549*** -3.75 -2.33848*** -6.81 
Sigma_ η (Standard Error) 2.00075  (0.044) 1.81321 (0.018) 
τ  0.80012  0.76678   
Log likelihood -9401.71  -59478.79   
* (**) [***] Statistically significant at the 10% (5%) [1%] level of significance. 
 (a) Includes controls for year-quarter effects. 
 (b) Individual effects are allowed to depend on overtime means of all time-varying explanatory,    
       variables each suffixed by b in all tables. 
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Table 4:  Results  from Dynamic Unobserved Effects Probit Model (1999Q2 – 2002Q4)a 
  White (Obs=29055) Non-White (Obs=168705) 
Variable Coef t-stat Coef t-stat 
Ftemploylag 1.62937*** 49.85 1.44756*** 114.3
Age -0.00224 -0.13 -0.00867 -1.24
Agesquared -0.00013 -0.59 -0.00006 -0.67
Hsgrad 0.15145*** 2.6 0.14468*** 6.51
Longterm -0.12732** -2.09 -0.13327*** -5.5
Children -0.11142** -2.44 -0.02270** -1.96
Lfcompete -0.00007 -1.61 0.00000 0.09
Access 0.00008 1.16 0.00002 1.42
Ccemp -0.00248 -1.14 0.00055 0.88
Informal 0.10662 1.39 0.38128*** 14.32
Informal*Children 0.05905* 1.9 -0.00026 -0.03
Povrate -0.34231 -0.5 -0.08939 -0.81
Transitqm 0.05753 0.26 -0.05909 -1.05
Pubh 0.04055 0.17 -0.00122 -0.03
Clayton 0.14545 0.47 0.02835 0.34
Dekalb   -0.00129 -0.02
I20South 0.12285 0.38 -0.29687** -2.31
I20North 0.13085 0.43 -0.11504 -1.03
Ftemploy0 1.76830*** 21.96 1.61747*** 49.26
Childrenb 0.06301 0.88 -0.01339 -0.73
Ccempb -0.00098 -0.35 -0.00098 -1.05
Informal*Childrenb 0.0181 0.2 0.06168** 2.41
Transitqmb 0.02137 0.08 0.04167 0.58
Pubhb 0.1146 0.4 0.01874 0.32
Claytonb -0.27045 -0.78 -0.06012 -0.59
Dekalbb -0.15282** -2.15
I20Southb -0.18888 -0.54 0.22011 1.54
I20Northb -0.18672 -0.57 -0.08298 -0.67
Constant -2.03543*** -5.49 -1.7601*** -13.08
Sigma_ η (Standard Error) 0.90937 (0.029) 0.88327 (0.011)
τ  0.45264  0.43825  
Log likelihood -6930.14  -47692.11  
Chi-square Joint Significance Test Statistic (P-value):b 
Lfcompete1 –Lfcompete15 15.00 (0.451)  1.71(0.624)  
Access1-Access15 31.89 (0.007)  39.20 (0.001)  
Informal1 – Informa115 26.17 (0.036)  86.38 (0.000)  
* (**) [***] Statistically significant at the 10% (5%) [1%] level of significance.   
(a) Includes controls for year-quarter effects.  
(b) Individual effects are allowed to depend on per period values of variables suffixed by 1 through 15.      
    To conserve on degrees of freedom, individual effects depend on over time means for other variables,   
     suffixed by b. 
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Variable 1999:Q2-2002:Q4c 1999:Q2 2001:Q1 2002:Q4
Ftemploylag 0.3298 0.2911 0.3327 0.3215
Children  -0.0098 -0.0103 -0.0096 -0.0085
Informal 0.0302 0.0224 0.0291 0.0298
Lfcompete (One SD)  -0.0217 -0.0150 -0.0229 -0.0215
Access ( One SD) 0.0022 0.0015 0.0023 0.0021
Ftemploylag 0.3188 0.2816 0.3184 0.3248
Children  -0.0037 -0.0026 -0.0039 -0.0039
Informal 0.0626 0.0488 0.0640 0.0636
Access ( One SD) 0.0012 0.0008 0.0012 0.0013
c  Computed as a simple average of APEs for 15 periods. 
Table 5: Average Partial Effects - Estimated Probability of
TANF Recipient Being Employed Full-timea,b
   partial effect is for a discrete change from 0 to 1.
Whites:
Nonwhites: 
b For  a given dummy variable (state dependence or  informal child care), the average
a Predicted responses to  a unit increase in key control variables obtained from the 
  dynamic unobserved effects probit model. SD refers to standard deviation.  
 
 
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics for Nonwhite TANF Public  
Housing Residents (Obs=35041)a 
(1999:Q1 - 2002:Q4 Unbalanced Panel) 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent Variable 
Ftemploy 0.19 0.40 0 1 
Individual Characteristics 
Age 33.84 10.42 16 65 
Agesquared 1253.89 795.24 257.32 4219.30 
Hsgrad 0.32 0.47 0 1 
Longterm 0.78 0.42 0 1 
Children  2.71 1.60 1 13 
Access to Job Growth and Competing Labor Supply 
Lfcompete 7160.43 3094.57 355.70 11183.79 
Access -88.21 673.03 -4805.66 4894.26 
Childcare 
Ccemp 6.00 13.03 0.00 119.67 
Informal 0.44 0.50 0 1 
Neighborhood and Transit Variables   
Povrate 0.55 0.18 0.02 0.77 
Transitqm 0.90 0.30 0 1 
Counties 
Fulton 0.88 0.32 0 1 
a There are 2906 TANF recipients observed  for a minimum  of  2 and  
 a maximum of 16 quarters, with an average of 12.1 quarters per 
individual.  
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Table 7:  Results for Nonwhite TANF Public Housing Residents  (Obs=22590, 1999Q2 – 2002Q4)a
  
 Chamberlain Random Effects 
Probit 
Dynamic Unobserved Effects 
Probit  
Variable Coef t-stat Coef t-stat 
Ftemploylag 1.43367*** 38.97
Age -0.96034* -1.83 0.03665* 1.68
Agesquared -0.00271*** -4.89 -0.00081*** -2.67
Hsgrad 0.3766*** 4.84 0.13524** 1.99
Longterm -0.45646*** -5.18 -0.22391*** -2.81
Children 0.01886 0.75 0.0279 0.82
Lfcompete 0.00001 0.28 0.00003 0.87
Access 0.00002 1.39 0.00001 0.46
Ccemp 0.00245 0.91 0.00215 0.56
Informal 0.99077*** 15.83 0.51691*** 6.52
Informal*Children -0.01647 -0.86 -0.0214 -0.94
Povrate 0.11079 0.33 0.24198 0.37
Transitqm 0.80401* 1.92 -0.17777 -0.1
Fulton -0.84018** -2.19 0.03238 0.02
Ageb 0.99159* 1.88  
Agesquaredb 0.00215*** 3.31  
Childrenb -0.03002 -0.63 0.01325 0.23
Lfcompeteb 0.00002 0.46  
Accessb 0.00068 1.18  
Ftemploy0 1.81882*** 15.59
Ccempb 0.00278 0.68 -0.00259 -0.55
Informalb 1.01117*** 4.00    
Informal*Childrenb 0.0542 0.67 -0.03038 -0.39
Transitqmb -0.92367** -2.21 0.24616 0.14
Fultonb 0.99724*** 2.67 0.01721 0.01
Constant -5.7063*** -5.05 -3.03701*** -7.61
Sigma_ η (Standard Error) 1.63583 (0.034) 0.86118 (0.032)
τ  0.72796 0.42583 
Log likelihood -10087.92 -5844.8 
Chi-square Joint Significance Test Statistic (P-value):b 
Lfcompete1 –Lfcompete15 10.26 (0.803) 
Access1-Access15 42.30 (0.000) 
Informal1 – Informal15 31.67 (0.007) 
* (**) [***] Statistically significant at the 10% (5%) [1%] level of significance. 
(a) Models control for year-quarter effects. 
 (b) Individual effects are allowed to depend on per period values of variables suffixed by 1 through 15.   
       To conserve on degrees of freedom, individual effects depend on over time means for other    
        variables, suffixed by b. 
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Variable 1999:Q2-2002:Q4c 1999:Q2 2001:Q1 2002:Q4
Ftemploylag 0.2910 0.2261 0.2833 0.3044
Informal 0.0672 0.0467 0.0688 0.0685
Access (One  SD) 0.0009 0.0005 0.0009 0.0010
b For  a given dummy variable (state dependence or  informal child care), the average
   partial effect is for a discrete change from 0 to 1.
c  Computed as a simple average of APEs for 15 periods. 
Table 8: Average Partial Effects - Estimated Probability of Nonwhite
TANF Public Housing Resident Being Employed Full-timea,b
a Predicted responses to  a unit increase in key control variables obtained from the 
  dynamic unobserved effect probit model.  SD refers to standard deviation. 
 
 
 
    Appendix A:  Detailed Results from Dynamic Unobserved Effects    
                                   Probit Model of Table 4 
 
Table A1: Detailed Results  from Dynamic Unobserved Effects Probita 
(1999Q2 – 2002Q4) 
  White (Obs=29055) Nonwhite (Obs=168705) 
Variable Coef t-stat Coef t-stat 
Ftemploylag 1.62937*** 49.85 1.44756*** 114.3 
Age -0.00224 -0.13 -0.00867 -1.24 
Agesquared  -0.00013 -0.59 -0.00006 -0.67 
Hsgrad 0.15145*** 2.6 0.14468*** 6.51 
Longterm -0.12732** -2.09 -0.13327*** -5.5 
Children -0.11142** -2.44 -0.0227** -1.96 
Lfcompete -0.00007 -1.61 0.00000 0.09 
Access 0.00008 1.16 0.00002 1.42 
Ccemp -0.00248 -1.14 0.00055 0.88 
Informal 0.10662 1.39 0.38128*** 14.32 
Informal*Children 0.05905* 1.9 -0.00026 -0.03 
Povrate -0.34231 -0.5 -0.08939 -0.81 
Transitqm 0.05753 0.26 -0.05909 -1.05 
Pubh 0.04055 0.17 -0.00122 -0.03 
Clayton 0.14545 0.47 0.02835 0.34 
Dekalb -0.00129 -0.02 
I20South 0.12285 0.38 -0.29687** -2.31 
I20North 0.13085 0.43 -0.11504 -1.03 
Ftemploy0 1.76830*** 21.96 1.61747*** 49.26 
Lfcompete1b -0.00007 -1.21 0.00002 1.49 
Lfcompete2 0.00008 0.9 0.00000 -0.14 
Lfcompete3 -0.00008 -0.76 -0.00002 -1.08 
Lfcompete4 0.00007 0.6 -0.00001 -0.3 
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Lfcompete5 -0.00016 -1.19 0.00001 0.28 
Lfcompete6 0.00014 1 -0.00003 -1.14 
Lfcompete7 -0.00002 -0.11 0.00004 1.45 
Lfcompete8 0.00001 0.08 0.00002 0.68 
Lfcompete9 -0.00024 -0.75 -0.00004 -1.2 
Lfcompete10 0.00040 1.24 -0.00002 -0.47 
Lfcompete11 -0.00015 -0.66 0.00004 1.16 
Lfcompete12 0.00006 0.19 -0.00001 -0.24 
Lfcompete13 -0.00007 -0.21 -0.00003 -0.92 
Lfcompete14 0.00037* 1.93 0.00003 0.81 
Lfcompete15 -0.00027* -1.76 0.00000 0.00 
Access1 0.00027* 1.72 0.00010** 2.15 
Access2 -0.00008 -0.6 0.00001 0.29 
Access3 0.00016 1 -0.00005** -2.05 
Access4 -0.00021 -1.31 0.00002 0.7 
Access5 0.00001 0.05 0.00003 1.29 
Access6 0.00027* 1.72 0.00002 0.81 
Access7 0.00008 0.49 0.00005** 1.99 
Access8 0.00001 0.06 0.00002 0.62 
Access9 0.00052*** 2.74 0.00010*** 4.21 
Access10 -0.00001 -0.09 0.00005* 1.87 
Access11 0.00004 0.29 0.00003 0.98 
Access12 0.00014 0.92 0.00003 1.31 
Access13 0.00041** 2.49 0.00005* 1.92 
Access14 0.00044** 2.52 0.00003 1.22 
Access15 0.00044*** 2.59 0.00010*** 2.59 
Informal1 -0.27332 -1.4 -0.38545*** -4.1 
Informal2 -0.00518 -0.06 0.01553 0.45 
Informal3 0.16763* 1.72 -0.03767 -1 
Informal4 -0.16752 -1.48 0.11969*** 3 
Informal5 0.20176 1.64 0.03394 0.82 
Informal6 0.02128 0.16 -0.03527 -0.76 
Informal7 0.08213 0.56 0.11148** 2.23 
Informal8 -0.03973 -0.25 0.02756 0.56 
Informal9 -0.04443 -0.25 0.0199 0.41 
Informal10 0.34919* 1.77 0.01726 0.32 
Informal11 -0.6134*** -3.13 0.03726 0.64 
Informal12 0.64556*** 3.06 -0.01296 -0.22 
Informal13 -0.20455 -1 0.06011 1.06 
Informal14 -0.00538 -0.03 -0.02071 -0.36 
Informal15 -0.05306 -0.35 0.12547*** 2.82 
Childrenb 0.06301 0.88 -0.01339 -0.73 
Ccempb -0.00098 -0.35 -0.00098 -1.05 
Povrateb -0.43864 -0.55 -0.18668 -1.31 
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Informal*Childrenb 0.01810 0.2 0.06168** 2.41 
Transitqmb 0.02137 0.08 0.04167 0.58 
Pubhb 0.11460 0.4 0.01874 0.32 
Claytonb -0.27045 -0.78 -0.06012 -0.59 
Dekalbb  -0.15282** -2.15 
I20Southb -0.18888 -0.54 0.22011 1.54 
I20Northb -0.18672 -0.57 -0.08298 -0.67 
Constant -2.03543*** -5.49 -1.7601*** -13.08 
* (**) [***] Statistically significant at the 10% (5%) [1%] level of significance. 
(a) Includes controls for year-quarter effects. 
 (b) Individual effects are allowed to depend on per period values of all variables       
      suffixed by 1 through 15. To conserve on degrees of freedom, individual effects    
      depend on over time means for other variables, suffixed by b. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
